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Abstract
Democracy and democratization at the European level have long been a non-problem. The
issues related to democracy after the Second World War were purely national (would Italy and
Germany finally be able to build up and consolidate their new democratic systems?) or international (would the Western-type democracies be able to resist and counterweight the Soviet-style
Eastern European regimes?). When the first foundations of what would become the European
Union (”EU”) were laid down, very few had a democratic vision in mind. The then-dominant
concerns were both economic (how to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe while avoiding again
the economic and military domination of Germany over the continent) and security-related (how
to strengthen the Atlantic alliance and reintegrate Germany in the defense of the West). Only a
few idealist visionaries were dreaming of a democratized and united Europe, but few others were
paying attention to what was perceived as intellectual fantasies.
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INTRODUCTION
Democracy and democratization at the European level have
long been a non-problem. The issues related to democracy after
the Second World War were purely national (would Italy and
Germany finally be able to build up and consolidate their new
democratic systems?) or international (would the Western-type
democracies be able to resist and counterweight the Soviet-style
Eastern European regimes?). When the first foundations of what
would become the European Union ("EU") were laid down, very
few had a democratic vision in mind. The then-dominant
concerns were both economic (how to facilitate the
reconstruction of Europe while avoiding again the economic and
military domination of Germany over the continent) and
security-related (how to strengthen the Atlantic alliance and
reintegrate Germany in the defense of the West). Only a few
idealist visionaries were dreaming of a democratized and united
Europe, but few others were paying attention to what was
perceived as intellectual fantasies.
However, the worm was in the fruit. Like many other
international organizations of the post-war period, the new
European institutions, starting with the Coal and Steel
Community, were paying lip-service to some formal dimensions
* Emeritus President, European University Institute.

1287

1288 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1287
of democratic settings. On the surface, the new international
bodies were mimicking the structures of democratic institutions,
following a pattern established after the First World War under
the influence of the Wilsonian idealism. The institutional tool kit
was not only made of the representatives of the national
executives but some forms of separation of powers were
introduced, such as an Assembly and some embryonic
jurisdictional components. Notwithstanding these apparent
improvements, not much changed as, actually, all components of
the international organizations were deriving from and under
the final control of the sovereign states. They were and still are,
for most of them, like Potemkin-type artificial settings. They were
supposed to create positive feelings and give the illusion that
pure state power was mitigated but rather quickly nobody was
fooled anymore by this imaginative trompe-l'oeil.
An ample body of historical, legal, and political research has
explained why this has not happened with the European
institutions even if, in a sophisticated but not fully convincing
thesis, Allan Milward has argued that the construction of Europe
has been mainly a successful rescue of the nation-states.' What
made the difference was the supranational elements introduced
in the European treaties: the worm. Community institutions were
not only the extended arms of the states. If one accepts for a
moment with Truman that everything, including institutions, are
actually interests and only interests, it means that a new set of
actors and interests could make a breakthrough and influence
the working and evolution of institutions.2 It also shows that if
institutions are largely determined by their original genetic code,
there is room for evolution and transformation if the appropriate
ingredients for change are already there as potentials. In other
words when the institutional setting is not completely locked in
and actors are given tools for further developments, new
initiatives or constructive interpretations are possible-or when
any change or development calls for additional innovation,
creates new contradictions, or needs requesting to go one step
further. This cannot be seen as a classical spillover effect from
1. See generally ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION STATE (2d

ed. 2000).
2. DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC OPINION 26-27, 43-44 (2d ed. 1971).
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economics to politics but rather as a kind of mechanical effect of
institutional dynamics. Every step triggers more requests for
further change as it entails the mobilization of interested groups
and creates new dissatisfactions or contradictions.
From this point of view the debate on the democratic
dimension of Europe is illuminating and constitutes a neverending illustration of the dynamics of the democratization
processes. Since the 1950s, every new treaty has introduced some
form of progress, and it is fascinating to observe that far from
satisfying the elites or the public opinion, every improvement has
increased frustrations and dissatisfactions, paving the ground for
future changes.
Before examining the state of the democratic issue at the
European level, two preliminary observations have to be made.
First, since mankind's debates over democracy, i.e., from the time
of ancient Greece, the same word is utilized to describe or
prescribe very different realities. It is both a source of
confusion-as shown for example by the present populist
upsurge,3 which, beyond the peculiar rhetoric of these protest
parties, is fundamentally a debate about what democracy is or
should be-and a springboard for variegated claims and visions.
As a result, the debate about the conditions and ways of crafting
democracy at the European level has raged over time and still
continues. It is striking to observe afterwards that the supposedly
efficient remedies prescribed to the patient by many doctors of
democracy have failed to cure the democratic malaise.
Second, the debates, analyses, and proposals in matter of
democratization of Europe have been very much path-dependent
on the ways democracy has been experienced at the national
level. National democracies have served as yardsticks to gauge
and assess the value of the democratic elements of the European
system. They are good reasons for such an exercise. It is a
common practice both for scientists as well for common people
to start from the known to better understand the unknown or the
new. Comparison is always a useful instrument for evaluating
different realities. But the exercise may end both intellectually
3. See generally YVES MWNY & YNVES SUREL, PAR LE PEUPLE, POUR LE PEUPLE,
DEMOCRATIE ET POPULISME [BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE: POPULISM AND

DEMOCRACIES] (2000); DEMOCRACIES AND THE POPULIST CHALLENGE (Yves MWny & Yves

Surel eds., 2002).
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and in practical terms in an impasse when comparison is about
objects very different in nature or structure. A good illustration
of this has been the way in which democracy had been conceived
until the American and French Revolutions, whose initial
objectives were less democracy than the establishment of
republics. The dominant thinking at the time was still deeply
influenced by the experience of ancient times, that is, a system
involving every citizen and as a consequence reserved to tiny
polities endowed with virtuous citizens. The epistemological
rupture, to use Kuhn's wording,4 occurred when the British
principle of representation was combined with the principle of
people's sovereignty, putting in place a system named Democracy
but which had little to do with the regime invented in Athens.
Since then the democratic regimes have considerably changed,
to such an extent that it -would be difficult by contemporary
standards to recognize the quality of democracy in the France or
United States of that time. But the matrix has remained more or
less the same and has served as a reference model to all or most
of the democracies established afterwards. Over time, a quasi
indissoluble link between the concepts of nation, state, and
democracy has been forged and has become an indisputable
dogma. One can observe since the nineteenth century the
growing standardization of forms of power organization. The
French philosopher Henri Lefebvre underlined that our time is
characterized by a process of elimination-at least in institutional
terms-of the traditional forms of governance (tribes, kingdoms,
fiefdoms, empires, etc.) and their replacement by what he calls
"the catholicity of the State"-in other words its universality.5
The same can be said of the concepts of nation or democracy
adopted everywhere as central values even when reality shows
that it is a tragic farce. The world is still trapped in a conception
of democracy limited to the nation-state in the same way that it
was previously reserved to small cities. The skeptical attitude of a
weekly such as The Economist is telling: "In the real world when
democracy gets much beyond the nation-state, it stumbles."6

4. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 42 (1st ed.
1962).
5. HENRI LEFEBVRE, DE L'tTAT [ON THE STATE] (1976).
6. Charlemagne:Before the Altar of Europe, ECONOMIST,July 3, 2010, at 52.
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From this point of view, it is interesting to note the evolution
of political thinking in the nineteenth century when it was
argued that democracy was emerging first at the local level
(promoted as a school of democracy) while such a line of
thought is rarely transposed when it comes to the link between
democracy at the nation-state level and democracy beyond the
state. The dominant view today is similar to the previous impasse:
democracy in spite of its intrinsic flaws and defects is the best
possible regime but, unfortunately, it cannot be transferred to
the supranational level. The European Union offers a fertile
ground of observation for checking several questions from a
normative and empirical point of view. The first question is
related to its feasibility. Skeptics are ready to accept that a
supranational democracy might be desirable but express many
doubts about the possibility to make that dream come true. The
harsh reality of international politics is the power of the states
organized around the concept of sovereignty (established against
the twin supranational power of the emperor and of the church).
There is little or no room for democracy in this universe of cold
monsters. The second question is related to its necessity. While
the debate has been dominated by the so-called democratic
deficit of the European institutions, alternative views have argued
in the opposite direction and suggested that it was a false
problem. The third set of question relates to the evolution of
Europe as it stands today. The EU is in a half-way situation: there
are some democratic features already in place but at the same
time very few would characterize the present setting as a full-flesh
democratic system. So the question becomes: Is this instable and
unfinished equilibrium sustainable in the long-term? Is it possible
for the EU to go forward with such an incomplete democratic
setting? And if not, what consequences to be drawn? A deepening
of the democratic instruments with the risk that such a modern
empire knows the fate of the old ones? Or a more restrained
strategy implying that democracy would remain a utopian dream?
I.

A DEMOCRATIC EUROPE: REALISTIC OR UTOPIAN?

The coalition denouncing the democratic deficit of Europe
is variegated and heterogeneous. It includes not only convinced
federalists, advocates of supranational democratization such as
the Greens or the alter-mondialistes but also the extreme right
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and the extreme left, the euro-skeptics, and all the populists
movements that have blossomed all over Europe. Obviously not
all are advocates of a more democratic Europe as some are
deeply hostile to the European construction as such. But as the
dismantlement of the EU is not (yet) part of the dominant
discourse, all, in one way or one another, have contributed to
build up a wide consensus about the necessity of a more
democratic Europe given the wide dissatisfaction with the present
setting. The main beneficiary of these pressures has been the
European Parliament, which has been prompt in using the
argument (initiated by David Marquand in the early 1970s7 ) in
favor of extending its powers.
However, many have insisted that the preconditions for the
establishment of a European wide democratic system were not
met. There is nothing such as a European People, but only a vast
conglomerate of peoples speaking at least twenty different
languages with no common identity, shared memories, or sense
of solidarity. This argument is very strong as Europe's history is
indeed plagued with conflicts, wars, and hostility, in particular
vis-A-vis the closest neighbors. History is jammed with soft or
dramatic examples of ethnic cleansing that have found their
justification and legitimacy in the principle of self-determination
of each nation usually defined by its cultural, religious, or
linguistic homogeneity. It is an argument that is often heard in
Britain and France, two countries with different but very strong
stories and narratives of nation-building. It is actually rather
paradoxical as the present historical outcome (a strong national
identity) is the byproduct of a long process whose starting point
was extreme heterogeneity and diversity. From a historical
perspective they should be considered as the best possible
illustration that a democratic system contributes as much to the
nation-building process as it is conditioned by it. The
homogeneity of the nation as a precondition for the legitimacy of
the state and then of its democratic system is historically false. It
is a particularly powerful ideological construct as it has become
the dominant narrative and is part of elite and popular beliefs in
most countries. Rare are those, such as Spain, that have accepted
a diverse reading of their constitutive process.

7. See generally DAVID MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE (1979).
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National homogeneity as a precondition of democratic
legitimacy is not only historically false; it is empirically wrong.
The example of compound and heterogeneous democracies are
plenty. Without mentioning the United States, where a very
strong identity has been built up over time out of a desperate mix
of cultures and traditions, one can list Canada, India, and
Switzerland as cases of successful democratic confederations in
spite of extreme (and much more acute, for instance, in the case
of India) diversity.
These factual considerations should not, however, hide the
difficulties that Europe is facing in transforming itself into a fullfleshed democratic system. First, as already underlined, even if
historically and empirically wrong, the narrative about the
definition of democracy as feasible only within the framework of
the nation-state is extremely powerful. Alternative discourses
have remained the privilege of small elites or parties. National
leaders are not prepared to be the seconds in Rome and still
prefer being the firsts in their villages. Second, European history,
especially since the nineteenth century, is marked by its inability
to build democratic systems incorporating populations of diverse
linguistic, religious, or cultural origins. The empires of the past
have failed and broken up while small countries have not
succeeded in avoiding tensions between their various
components. The fate of the former Czechoslovakia, the tragic
destiny of Yugoslavia, and the endless saga of the Belgian
linguistic and cultural divisions underline how much the Swiss
case is the exception confirming the rule. Furthermore, the
national dimension of democracy has been consolidated over
time by the development and growth of the welfare systems. 8
Welfare policies are nearly exclusively national in conception,
scope, and fulfillment. As the Europeans consider by now that
this dimension is intrinsically part of a "social market
democracy," it makes it more difficult to conceive of a European
level without this crucial twentieth century addition.
The only way out of this apparently inextricable dilemma is
time. There is probably no solution if one expects a full-fleshed
European democratic system as some activists of the European
Constitution hoped. The Philadelphian moment has been missed
8. See Maurizio Ferrera, National Welfare States and European Integration:In Search of a
'Virtuous Nesting,'47J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 219 (2009).
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for a basic reason: Unlike the fathers of the American
Constitution, the European Convention was working with the
peoples of Europe on their shoulders. Philadelphia was a
successful coup, which could not be reproduced in the context of
twenty-first century Europe. In Europe, national democracies are
the result of a slow process of sedimentation and, for most of
them, completed very recently. European democracy is not
impossible; it is conceptually feasible but as put by Mitterrand in
a different context: "11 faut laisser du temps au temps" and
content oneself with imperfect and incomplete solutions.
Once this first obstacle is put aside, an embryonic
democratic system can be put in place, using the tool kit available
across the so many different types of democracies. Like its
national counterparts and models, a democratic system of
European governance must be representative, accountable, and
capable of delivering. Assessed against this yardstick, the
European system fits quite well the time predicament. Indeed, if
judged by reference to present democratic standards, the
European set of institutions might look predemocratic: the voters
have no clue about who will lead the winning coalition, the
Members of the European Parliament ("MEPs") have no real
influence on the choice of the president of the Commission,
while the representation of the peoples, as underlined by the
German Constitutional Court, is distorted to the benefit of small
countries by a strong negative bias against the largest states. On
the other hand, it is telling that when Marquand first used the
famous "democratic deficit" catchphrase, he was criticizing the
election of MEPs through indirect suffrage and was considering
that a direct choice by the electorate would offset one of the
main flaws affecting the election of peoples' representatives. A
few years later, his suggestions were fulfilled and yet, the
democratic deficit debate raged even more, indicating that the
issue could not be fully addressed only through the use of
techniques void of real substance.9 Voting is fundamental
provided that voters feel that it is meaningful if one wants to
avoid populist backlashes.
Accountability is the second requirement invented by the
representative government theory. The forms of political
9. See Yves MCny, De la dimocratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges, 41
COMMON MKT. STUD. 1 (2002).

J. OF
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accountability are many, and while some are well defined by legal
and constitutional rules, new ones linked to the rise of media and
polls' influence have transformed the system to a large extent. It
is telling, for instance, that in Great Britain few governments are
censured by the Parliament, but leaders are thrown out by their
party when there is a feeling that the elections will be lost unless
the prime minister is sacked. No such thing exists in the EU,
where the accountability of the Commission remains a rare
occurrence (once in sixty years) and where the unclear decisionmaking mechanisms make it difficult-even for the experts-to
attribute the responsibility of choices and orientations to a
specific set of actors. As argued by Peter Mair, "[B] ecause we are
denied an appropriate political arena in which to hold European
governance accountable, we are almost pushed into organizing
opposition to Europe."' 0
Quite often, for instance, national governments blame the
ill-defined "Eurocrats" for decisions that they have taken
themselves. In Europe, the veil of ignorance is still very thick.
Accountability is concentrated at the bureaucratic level and
remains quite technical and formal while political accountability
remains an abstract concept, contributing to the disenchantment
and to the dissatisfaction of the European voters. Election after
election, "Why bother to vote?" becomes the dominant attitude
among the electorate. High turnover is secured only where
voting is mandatory. As put by Jean Leca in his masterly review
article of 2009,
The problem is not so much that it is impossible to provide a
clear picture of the European types of policy-making, it is
rather that it is impossible to trace those processes to a set of
identifiable authors and thus to deal with the 'intelligibility
problem,' whose democratic figure is the 'accountability
problem."'
The third component is the capacity of the accountable
representatives to deliver. Faced with the weak representativeness
and low accountability of the European institutions, Fritz Scharpf
10. Peter Mair, Political Opposition and the European Union, 42 GOV'T AND
OPPOSITION 1, 12 (2007).
11. Jean Leca, 'The Empire Strikes Back!' An Uncanny View of the European Union: Part
I-Do We Need a Theory of the European Union?, 44 Gov'T AND OPPOSITION 285, 294

(2009).
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has attempted to address the legitimacy problem by emphasizing
the distinction between input legitimacy (resulting from popular
support) and output legitimacy (resulting from the capacity to
deliver appropriate public goods).i2 Europe, from that
perspective could benefit from an enhanced legitimacy because
of its unique capacity to provide policies that are beyond nationstates' ability. But this distinction could only partially answer the
Lasswell question: "Who does what? When? And how? And to the
benefit of whom?" His other distinction between negative
integration and positive integration has contributed to better
address the final part of the question but at the same time
weaken the contribution of the policy output to the legitimacy
issue, as these policies might not be the ones expected by the
population. The latest analyses by Scharpf of European (non-)
social policies show that he has adopted a more distanced
approach. To this mismatch between capacity and expectations
(underlined again and again by eurobarometer polls or other
opinion studies), one must add the extreme-and growingrigidity of competences attributed to the European institutions.
While national democracies have no theoretical limits to their
powers other than their willingness to act or not (the sovereignty
paradigm), the European institutions have well defined and
restricted competences whose extension is often the byproduct of
crises or necessity. If one adds to this conceptual and
constitutional limitation the bureaucratic pesanteur that affects
the decision-making process and the implementation of
European policies, it becomes obvious that Europe, by now, has a
delivery problem that accentuates further the necessity to build
up a full-flesh democratic system.

II. DEMOCRACY: LUXURY OR NECESSITY?
The development of Europe is fascinating as it makes us
better understand the conditions under which democracy
functions properly. Over time, the EC, and then the EU, have
acquired nearly all the prerequisites of what makes a proper
democratic system according to the most demanding standards.
12. FRITZ W. SCHARPF, Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of
European Welfare States, in GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 15 (Gary Marks et al.
eds., 1996), reprinted in COMMUNITY AND AUTONOMY: INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES AND
LEGITIMACY IN MULTILEVEL EUROPE 91 (Fritz W. Scharpf ed., 2010).
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The Parliament is elected by universal suffrage and plays a role
that many national parliaments could envy. The checks and
balances are more developed than in many places, the rule of law
is better applied than in many Member States, there is little room
for clientelism or corruption, transparency is not only a slogan
but a well-entrenched practice, etc. And yet there is an
overwhelming feeling among the peoples of Europe that
democracy is more a desirable target than an achieved reality. As
put forward by dedicated federalist Andrew Duff, a British MEP,
"The European Union is known more for its law and bureaucracy
than for its justice and democracy."' 3
Few deny that there is no real problem with the present
setting. Andrew Moravcsik, for instance, insists that one should
not be bothered by the existing state of play since European
institutions work under strict rules of delegation by the Member
States whose democratic legitimacy is beyond any doubt.'4
Giandomenico Majone shares the same conclusions but from a
different angle, arguing that delegating regulation to ad hoc
bodies in order to maximize efficiency does not require
democratic legitimatization as would be the case for
redistributive policies. 15 Since the European competences do not
foresee such power (or do so only at the margins), the so-called
democratic deficit is a false problem.
Apart from these two major exceptions, there is quasiunanimity insisting that Europe should be democratic or arguing
against the intrusion of Europe in matters to be decided by the
democratic and legitimate national authorities. For the latter,
democracy is a necessity but only the national level can fulfill the
democratic requirements, while for the former, given that many
decisions cannot be taken any longer at the national level, the
only way out is democratization at the supranational level.
Personally, this author subscribes to this last view. If one agrees
that powers that cannot be properly exercised at the national
level have to be delegated to a supranational body, then
13. ANDREw DUFF, NOTRE EUROPE, POST-NATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE REFORM

OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 4-5 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.notreeurope.eu/uploads/tx-publication/PolicyPaper_01.pdf.
14. See generally Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing
Legitimacy in the European Union, 40J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 603 (2002).
15. GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, DILEMMAS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
AMBIGUITIES AND PITFALLS OF INTEGRATION BY STEALTH ch. 7 (2005).

THE
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democracy needs to be transplanted at this level as well, in
particular when transfers of competences are of such a
magnitude. During the 1980s, there was a lot of talk about the
hollowing of the state, but in that case it would rather mean the
hollowing of democracy because the areas left to the national
level would be only of secondary importance. The transfers of
powers have been considerable and have more and more impact
on the daily life of citizens, while there is not yet a proper
mechanism of political accountability. Voters are increasingly
frustrated and feel powerless as the national political class insists
that decisions are taken by a faceless bureaucracy over which
nobody can exert pressure or influence. One can observe a
growing disenchantment or hostility vis-A-vis Europe, even in
countries that have greatly benefited from the European
integration process. For a long time, the dominant view has
considered that economic policies were too important to be left
to political bodies or parties and that one would be better off if
managed by a right combination of market and independent
experts (authorities, central banks, agencies). The recent global
crisis has both shown the limits of that ideological choice as well
as the re-emergence of states as ultimate payers and warrants of
the economic system.

Insisting that democracy is a necessity at the supranational
level when so many powers have been transferred by national
authorities does not solve the problem. Democracy is not just a
tool box as so many propagandists have tended to pretend.
Creating or exporting democracy needs much more than
elections and a few institutions. People have to be convinced that
democratic rules are the best and legitimate instruments to rule
their community. This faith and belief is not easy to build: each
polity is constructed through a set of narratives, myths, and
collective images created by political groups and leaders with the
contribution of historians, thinkers, and the active role of the
education system. But quite often it is not enough; in the course
of the two past centuries where the process of nation-building has
preceded the democratization process, very few political systems
have avoided the trauma of a civil war whatever was the name
given to the fights ("revolutions," for instance). In order for a
political system to be perceived as democratic by the people(s),
the citizens must feel to be members of a community, of a polity.
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Europe is still far from this prerequisite. There are historical and
cultural reasons for that. But the peculiarities of European
development accentuate the difficulty. Europe is a moving
reality, which, over a few years, has shifted from six to nine,
twelve, fifteen, twenty-five, and finally twenty-seven members.
And the game is not over. A polity needs borders and neighbors
in order to define itself internally and externally. Being in a state
of permanent flux does not help. As Jean Leca has put it bluntly,
"The vicious circle of success is complete: no European polity
without a leadership, no leadership without a global project,
towards either the outside . . . or the inside or both, no project
without a polity." 16 This rather desperate conclusion underlines
the difficulty of the democratization process as each
precondition is itself subordinated to another precondition,
making the starting point of change impossible or difficult to
find. Paradoxically, the preconditions for establishing a
European democracy system were more favorable thirty or forty
years ago than today: in the 1960s, the national systems were
more fragile and less assertive, particularly in countries like Italy
or Germany, the dominant political parties supported the
European construction, the welfare state systems were still
underdeveloped, and the federalist dream was a powerful drive.
The main obstacles to such a favorable evolution were France
(within) and Britain (outside), but the need to build up a
democratic system was not so pressing since Europe was still a
dwarf with limited impact on policy-making and national
sovereignty.
Europe today is in a paradoxical and quasi-inextricable
situation. Never as in the present circumstances has a democratic
European system been so much needed as today, when the
contradictions between effective policy-making and political
responsibility are growing. The attempt to put in place a
Constitution for Europe was both felt as a necessity and feared as
a further weakening of the protective national democracies. Its
failure is symbolic and its resurrection as a treaty shows
altogether the limits of democratic ambition. The constitution
would have gone one step further but not far enough to properly
address the democratic deficit. The mechanics were improved
but there was little "political energy" in terms of parties,
16. Leca, supra note 11, at 296.
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leadership, purposes, and narratives. The "efficient parts" (to use
the Bagehot wording in the English Constitution 7 ) were there.
The "dignified parts" ("[T]hose which excite and preserve the
reverence of the population"'") were absent and the few
elements that were attempting to play this role in the preamble
have been erased. The devil is in the details.

III. THE INCOMPLETE DEMOCRATIC CONTRACT: IS IT
SUSTAINABLE?
Europe was not born as a democracy, a fate which, by all
means, is not exceptional and has been shared by most if not all
the nation-states at the time of their emergence. Within nations,
the establishment of democratic institutions and practices has
been incremental most of the time, in particular in the
nineteenth century. Only in a few cases has it accompanied the
creation of the state. Quite often elements, which by themselves
do not belong to the initial democratic creed, such as the
protection of rights, have emerged in aristocratic or monarchic
regimes before being considered as part and parcel of
democracies. The Rechtsstaat anticipated by many years the
setting up of democracy in Germany to take just one example. In
most cases suffrage was restricted to a few, power was in the
hands of the executive, and judicial control was limited. Checks
and balances were an American concept with little impact in
Europe. On both sides of the Atlantic it took more than 150 years
to reach a satisfactory democratic development (women were not
entitled to vote until 1947 in France and, in the United States,
fundamental rights were not properly guaranteed in half of the
country). History sheds some light about the ways democracy
could unfold in Europe at the supranational level but
simultaneously underlines the differences between the national
and the supranational experiences. The first lesson is the
unstoppable course of democracy over time. The evolution has
not been linear and is sometimes bumpy, but the direction is
univocal. The second feature is that democracy triggers persistent
dissatisfaction and calls for constant improvement. It is an
unfinished business calling for a never-ending commitment.
17. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 44 (2d ed. 1873).
18. Id.
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Adjustments, reforms, and adaptations are in the genes of
democracy.
These fundamental characteristics fit quite well in the
European experience, which has been a building site since its
inception. Step by step, treaty after treaty, some kind of
democratic rules and institutions have emerged from a
predominantly international institutional model. And like in the
activated
has
improvement
every
models,
national
This
process
disappointment and further demands to go deeper.
has been made possible by incremental changes in both the
policy areas and processes. But the breaking point has been
reached when small adjustments are unable to cope with the
quality change implied by core transfers and democratic
requirements. The stillborn constitution and the Lisbon Treaty
have attempted in part to cut the Gordian knot, but they are still
insufficient to solve the problem. The fundamentals of
democracy are still lacking. In spite of all efforts, European
citizenship is still a void concept for most Europeans; solidarity,
which is a crucial ingredient of any community, sounds too often
as an empty word when it does not disguise pure self-interests.
The recent saga of the rescue of indebted Member States is
telling. Europe is not yet a polity; there are very little European
politics, and citizens are not yet fully convinced that their foreign
fellows are members of the same family. Leadership is lacking not
so much because of the personality of the European leaders, but
because the present set of institutions, rules, and conventions do
not allow for such a role. In a world where democracies are more
and more organized around the leadership of a prime minister
or president (only Switzerland is resisting the trend) the
headless19 (or multi-headed) Europe is a liability for the
democratic development of a supranational political system.
Nearly 150 years ago Bagehot observed that personalization was a
fundamental feature of political regimes and his observations are
still appropriate today. He wrote:
The nature of a constitution, the action of an assembly, the
play of parties, the unseen formation of a guiding opinion,
are complex facts, difficult to know, and easy to mistake. But
the action of a single will, the fiat of a single mind, are easy
ideas: anybody can make them out, and no one can ever
19. See generally LEADERLESS EUROPE (Jack Hayward ed., 2008).
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forget them. When you put before the mass of mankind the
question, 'Will you governed by a king, or will you be
governed by a Constitution?' the inquiry comes out thus'Will you be governed in a way you understand, or will you be
governed in a way you do not understand?' 2 0
Obviously it will be ridiculous to make a plea for a European
Napoleonic regime but Bagehot had a point. There is no
identity, community, or polity without some kind of emotions,
narratives, symbols, and embodiment of values in political parties
and leaders. Unfortunately, like the Kantian universal peace, the
Habermassian concept of constitutional patriotism is too dry and
abstract a proposal to deal with the European problem (and it
presupposes that there is a patrie, a homeland, precisely what is
still missing).
National democracies have gone through several steps in
their process of consolidation: enfranchising the people, the
building up of institutions and rules of the game involving the
political parties, and, later on, the development of the welfare
state systems. Nations have become democratic by striking
compromises between social classes and between the state and
the market. The fundamental flaw in the European construction
is that the European institutions have absorbed the market
regulation functions of the state, but are unable and unwilling to
take over the other elements of the contemporary social contract,
i.e., the redistributive functions. A crucial dimension of today's
politics is out of hand and the division of labor between Member
States and Brussels is not sustainable in the long run. Either
Europe finds ways to make European citizenship meaningful,
creating a new and still unknown form of democratic allegiance,
or the ambitions of Europe will have to be drastically revisited.
But even in that case, the European construction is at risk as the
intergovernmental dimension would have taken over. One
should remember the Vienna Congress. After the Napoleonic
wars and disasters-the functional equivalent of the Second
World War catastrophe-the European powers (united by
monarchic and social conservatism) agreed on a vision of Europe
dominated by large empires and small states under control.
Today, the European states, united in principle by the common
values of democracy and market, meet in Brussels and strike
20. BAGEHOT, supra note 17, at 61.
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deals in a way that recalls 1815 rather than Jean Monnet ideals.
This way of proceeding might last for some time but not forever.
Substantial changes will have to take place in order to evolve little
by little toward a European democratic system worthy of the
name. Again, such an enterprise will need a lot of time. But what
matters is the sense of direction. The least of which can be said is
that, for the time being, Europe is not on the right track.

